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never concern the jury. . . ." Texas has recognized this rule in
such decisions as Exporters' and Traders' Compress & Warehouse
Company v. Schulze 7 and Mustang Aviation, Inc., v. Ridgway."
However, the explanation must be one that can reasonably be
regarded as explaining away fault. There was no explanation in
the principal case.
James A. Knox.
PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS
VALIDITY OF FAIR TRADE ACT
Oklahoma. The Robinson-Patman Act' includes a provision
which prohibits sales at "unreasonably low prices" for the pur-
pose of destroying competition. This provision is similar to the
"sales below cost" statutes enacted in several states, but leaves un-
determined what constitutes "unreasonably low" prices. Whether
this standard is sufficiently definite has not been passed upon by
a federal appellate court.
The state legislatures, for the most part, did not attempt to
enact Fair Trade Laws until the United States Supteme Court deci-
sion in Nebbia v. New York2 provided a broad concept of police
17 265 S. W. 133 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
Is 21 S. W. 2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
149 STAT. 1526, § I(b) (1936), 15 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 13(b).
291 U. S. 502, 525, 537 (1934). In this case the New York Legislature had estab.
lished a Milk Control Board which was empowered to fix the maximum and minimum
retail prices charged for milk sold within the state. The defendant was convicted of
violation of the Board's order, and the constitutionality of the law establishing the Board
was the issue on appeal. The guiding principles obtained from Justice Roberts' opinion
are:
... And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.
It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances,
may be invalid for another sort,. .. because the reasonableness of each regulation
depends upon the relevant facts.
So far as the due process requirement is concerned, and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt and enforce whatever economic
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power not limited to the former concept, "affected with the public
interest." Two years after the Nebbia case, the Illinois Fair Trade
Act,8 permitting contracts for the control of resale prices of cer-
tain commodities, was sustained in Old Dearborn Distributors v.
Seagrams Distillers Corporation.4 With the green light furnished
by these decisions, Fair Trade Laws have been passed in many
states.
As a supplement to the Fair Trade Acts, several state legisla-
tures have passed statutes prohibiting sales below cost for the pur-
pose of destroying competition. The most frequent attack brought
against these statutes is that they contravene an owner's right to
sell his property-at whatever price he and the buyer may agree.
However, under the broad rule of the Nebbia decision, the acts
generally have been upheld when the state legislatures have made
wrongful intent a necessary element in the offense. A Minnesota
decision5 states that sales below cost may be prohibited regardless
of intent, but this holding is in the minority.' To date, Arkansas,
New Mexico and Oklahoma have adopted Unfair Trade Acts,
while Texas and Louisiana have not done so.
In Oklahoma the first Unfair Sales Act' adopted by the Legis-
lature was declared unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court because its terms subjected merchants to criminal penalties
for making sales below cost when such sales resulted in injury to
a competitor without regard to the merchant's intent in making
the sale.' In an effort to keep this type of statute on the books the
Oklahoma Legislature repealed the original Act and adopted the
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation.... And it is equally clear that if the legislative policy be to
curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not arbitrary
or discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise.
a ILL. REV. STAT. (1951) C. 1211/2, § 188 et seq.
4299 U. S. 183 (1936).
5McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W. 414 (1940).
6 Cases are collected in Notes, 162 A. L. R. 532 (1946) and 118 A. L. R. 506 (1939).
7 Laws 1941, p. 53; 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) §§ 592-597.
s201 Okla. 585, 208 P. 2d 376 (1949), noted 4 Southw. L. J. 327 (1950).
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present one.9 This Act provides that sales below cost by a mer-
chant with the intent to injure a competitor are unfair competition
and contrary to public policy."0 One section of the Act sets forth
the method to be used in computing "cost."'" Provision is made
for injunctive relief and assessment of fines 2 for violation of the
Act. It is of interest to note that a sale or an offer of sale below
cost shall be prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors
and lessen competition."3 In the overall picture, this clause leaves
the price-cutting merchant in difficulty unless he can produce a
valid reason for his low price. An exemption clause 4 permits sales
below cost in exceptional instances where they are necessary to
avoid a greater loss on the goods.
The Act was held constitutional in a 5-3 decision in Adwon v.
Oklahoma Retail Grocers Association.5 The court stated that its
previous objection to the statute had been met when wrongful
intent was made a prerequisite to punishment of an offender. The
dissenting opinion was primarily devoted to the argument that
the grocery business involved in the case was not the type of busi-
ness to which state regulation of this kind could properly be ap-
plied.
Common law principles governing agreements not to compete
have become well established over the years. Generally, the validity
hinges upon the reasonableness of the restraint imposed. The first
requirement for validity is that the agreement must be ancillary
and if it is limited as to time but not as to space, it is invalid; if
it is reasonably limited as to space, it is generally held valid re-
gardless of the period of time it is to run. 6 The reasonableness of
the limitation as to space is dependent upon the nature of the busi-
SLaws 1949, p. 103; 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) §§ 598.1-598.11.
10 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 598.3.
11 § 598.2.
12 § 598.4, f 5.
I' § 598.5.
14 § 598.6.
15 .----------- Okla . .......... 228 P. 2d 376 (1951).
16 See authorities collected in 17 C. J. S., Contracts, §§ 242-244.
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ness involved and the possible competition. These rules stem from
efforts of the court to require parties to abide by their contracts
and efforts to maintain a beneficial public policy by permitting
all persons to pursue the gainful occupation to which they are
suited or which they most desire. The rules themselves strike a
balance or middle ground which is founded upon the reason-
ableness of the agreement itself. Legislation has been enacted in
most states supplementing or enlarging upon the common law rules
against restraint of trade.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Texas. An agreement not to make an article except for the in-
ventor was held to be a contract in restraint of trade by the Su-
preme Court of Texas in Wissman v. Boucher.7 In this case the
plaintiff had come up with an idea for a collapsible fishing pole
suitable for use as a walking stick. The defendants who operated
a machine shop had made up sample poles for the plaintiff and
had agreed that they would not manufacture these poles except
for him. The idea itself, while novel, was not patentable. No trade
secrets were involved, since any competent machinist could dupli-
cate the device after a brief study of it. The agreement was com-
pletely unlimited as to time and space, within the class generally
held to be unreasonable and unenforceable, and was considered
by the court as simply an attempt by the plaintiff to buy off com-
petition.
A recent Texas decision has construed Section 1 of the Texas
Anti-Trust Act,18 which declares that a conspiracy in restraint of
trade exists "where any two or more persons, firms, corporations
or associations of persons, who are engaged in buying or selling
any article of merchandise, produce, or any commodity enter into
an agreement or undertaking to refuse to buy from or sell to any
1 - --.Tex.......-, 240 S. W. 2d 278 (1951).
28 TEx. R v. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 7428, § 1.
